The Architecture of Modern Power
The emergence of a new technological aristocracy represents a fundamental transformation in the structure of social power, one that bears striking parallels to medieval feudal systems. While the castles of silicon valley may lack the stone battlements of their medieval predecessors, they command territories far more vast and valuable than any feudal lord could have imagined.
This new aristocracy derives its power not from direct control over land and peasants, but through ownership of the digital infrastructure that increasingly mediates human existence. Social media platforms, payment systems, communication networks, and artificial intelligence systems form the essential infrastructure of modern life. Control over these systems grants their owners power that medieval lords would have instantly recognized – the power to permit or deny, to elevate or suppress, to grant access or impose exile.
The transformation of Elon Musk from technological innovator to political power broker illustrates this evolution perfectly. His acquisition of Twitter/X represents more than a business transaction – it marks the direct intervention of technological power into the mechanisms of democratic discourse. The platform's subsequent transformation demonstrates how private ownership of public squares can reshape political reality.
The parallel with feudal systems extends beyond surface similarities. Medieval feudalism functioned through a system of personal relationships and obligations, with power flowing through networks of loyalty and dependency. Today's technological feudalism operates through terms of service agreements, platform dependencies, and digital ecosystems that create similar networks of obligation and control.
Contemporary tech lords command private armies in the form of content moderators, security teams, and automated enforcement systems. They maintain private intelligence services through data collection and analysis capabilities that surpass those of many nation-states. Their platforms establish and enforce behavioral norms across vast digital territories, much as feudal lords once established local laws and customs.
The accumulation of wealth under this system has reached proportions that make meaningful comparison difficult. The resources commanded by leading tech figures exceed the GDP of many nations, granting them power to shape global events through private action. When Musk provides Starlink services to Ukraine or blocks them in Crimea, he exercises power traditionally reserved for sovereign states.
The relationship between this technological aristocracy and traditional state power grows increasingly complex. Like medieval nobles, tech lords alternatively collaborate with and challenge state authority. They maintain their own diplomatic relations, negotiate directly with foreign powers, and increasingly assert independence from national regulatory frameworks.
Most crucially, this new aristocracy has begun to establish its own systems of justice and governance. Content moderation policies, community guidelines, and algorithmic content curation represent private legal systems that operate largely beyond democratic control. Appeals processes within these systems increasingly resemble medieval courts, with platform owners serving as final arbiters of digital rights and privileges.
The New Social Order
The entrenchment of technological feudalism has created social hierarchies that mirror medieval structures with disturbing precision. At the apex sit the tech lords, commanding vast digital empires. Below them, a new professional class of highly paid technical workers serves as the equivalent of medieval knights and clerics, maintaining and expanding digital domains. At the bottom, the vast majority of people become digital peasants, surrendering their data and attention in exchange for access to essential platforms and services.
Social mobility in this new order increasingly resembles medieval patterns. While exceptional individuals might rise through technical skill or entrepreneurial ability, the primary path to power increasingly runs through existing tech feudalities. The startup world, once a realm of innovation and disruption, has become more akin to medieval apprenticeship systems, with successful founders usually emerging from established tech companies or prestigious universities.
The transformation of urban spaces under technological feudalism reveals its physical manifestation. Silicon Valley and other tech hubs increasingly resemble medieval city-states, with companies building self-contained campuses complete with housing, dining, and recreational facilities. These corporate feudal estates create complete social worlds, fostering absolute loyalty while isolating workers from broader society.
Education has been fundamentally reshaped by this new order. Traditional universities increasingly function as recruiting grounds for tech companies, while corporate training programs emerge as alternative credential systems. The power to certify technical competence, once held by academic institutions, increasingly shifts to private platforms and companies, creating new forms of professional certification and status.
Economic relationships under technological feudalism demonstrate familiar patterns of extraction and dependency. Digital platforms capture increasingly large portions of economic activity, positioning themselves as unavoidable intermediaries in commerce, communication, and social interaction. Small businesses and independent creators find themselves in relationships of feudal dependency, subject to arbitrary platform rules and revenue splits.
The consolidation of technological power has profound implications for labor relations. Platform workers, from delivery drivers to content creators, occupy positions analogous to medieval serfs, bound to digital platforms through economic necessity and algorithmic control systems. Their work enriches the platform owners while offering little opportunity for genuine economic advancement.
Privacy in this new order becomes a luxury commodity, available primarily to the technological aristocracy while the digital peasantry must surrender intimate personal data to participate in basic social and economic life. This asymmetry of privacy rights creates power differentials that reinforce existing hierarchies, as those with means can protect their information while others become increasingly transparent to surveillance and manipulation.
Cultural production under technological feudalism increasingly resembles medieval patronage systems. Content creators depend on platform algorithms for visibility, forcing them to adapt their work to maximize engagement metrics. The resulting cultural landscape becomes increasingly homogenized, shaped by algorithmic preferences rather than artistic or social value.
Resistance and Reformation
The entrenchment of technological feudalism has sparked diverse forms of resistance, from digital guilds to platform cooperatives. These movements echo medieval challenges to feudal power while adapting to contemporary technological realities. Understanding these resistance patterns becomes crucial for envisioning possible futures beyond digital feudalism.
Open source movements represent a modern equivalent to medieval commons, creating resources that exist outside feudal control. These digital commons provide alternative infrastructures for communication, computation, and collaboration. Their success demonstrates the possibility of technological development without feudal ownership, though they face constant pressure from commercial enclosure.
Platform cooperatives emerge as modern equivalents to medieval craft guilds, attempting to establish democratic alternatives to feudal platforms. These initiatives reimagine digital services as collectively owned utilities rather than private fiefdoms. While still marginal, they provide working models of democratic technological organization that challenge feudal assumptions about necessary hierarchies.
The rise of digital labor movements introduces new dynamics into technological feudalism. Gig workers, content creators, and tech workers increasingly organize across platform boundaries, challenging the atomization that platforms impose. These movements face significant obstacles but demonstrate the potential for collective action within digital economies.
Municipal and regional governments have begun asserting authority over digital domains, attempting to restore democratic control over technological infrastructure. These efforts mirror medieval cities' struggles for autonomy from feudal lords. Their success or failure may determine whether democratic governance can survive in the digital age.
Cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies present contradictory possibilities. While often promoted as tools for democratizing finance, they frequently reproduce feudal patterns with new technological justifications. The emergence of crypto-feudalism, with its own lords and vassals, demonstrates how technological innovation alone cannot guarantee democratic outcomes.
Privacy technologies and digital rights movements represent modern equivalents to medieval peasant revolts, attempting to reclaim fundamental rights from technological lords. These movements recognize that privacy and autonomy form the basis for democratic citizenship, making their protection essential for any post-feudal future.
Education emerges as a crucial battleground. Independent technical education initiatives attempt to break the monopoly of corporate certification systems. These efforts recognize that democratic technological literacy must extend beyond simple tool use to include understanding of systems and power structures.
The role of state power becomes increasingly crucial. Just as medieval monarchs sometimes allied with peasants and cities against feudal lords, democratic states may prove essential in checking the power of technological aristocrats. This requires reimagining regulation and governance for the digital age.
The environmental impact of technological feudalism demands attention. Server farms consuming vast energy resources mirror medieval manors extracting resources from surrounding territories. Sustainable alternatives must address both social and ecological dimensions of technological organization.
International coordination presents particular challenges. While technological feudalism operates globally, resistance often remains local. Building effective opposition requires new forms of international solidarity and coordination that can match the global reach of technological power.
The future remains undetermined. The current trajectory toward technological feudalism faces mounting resistance from democratic movements, environmental pressures, and internal contradictions. Whether these forces can generate genuine alternatives depends on our ability to imagine and implement democratic forms of technological organization.
Success requires moving beyond simple opposition to develop practical alternatives to feudal platforms. This means building democratic technological infrastructure, establishing new forms of digital rights, and creating governance systems appropriate for the digital age. The task parallels medieval social transformations in scope while demanding unprecedented speed and scale of change.
This looks like Yannis Varoufakis' book on techno-feudalism, and there is much to share and perhaps agree on in the arguments. Varufakis also has ideas about how to counter the unreasonable power of the Musks of this world.
It is not related at all to feudalism, although some armchair philosophers have labeled it as such.
In feudalism the peasant’s rights were tied directly to the land which was tied directly to the master/lord of that land and there were laws and an administrative process called the corvee system that began with the Romans. In feudalism, power revolved around the heritage of nobility and the titles that nobility granted to others. There were only three classes, the clergy/church, the nobility and those with titles and peasants.
What we have now is fascism that revolves around the power accumulated through the consolidation of capital and the repression of the working class. The infrastructure and capture of many institutions are somewhat revealed in the characteristics of fascism, which we can examine throughout history and engage in a comparative analysis to determine if we are a match.
The purpose of NOT calling it fascism is to obfuscate the tools that are available to fight fascism. There are precious few, but what is available is historically effective against it.
This dynamic revolves around the fact that capital is a mode of power in a capitalist society.
Capitalism has been able to consolidate capital continually since 1970 unabated almost. The fallout of this is the fact that the purchasing power of the rank and file worker has only risen +/- 10% in all that time. Since 1978 CEO salaries have risen over 1300%, although that is not the cause of the problem, it is just a symptom. We have over 800 billionaires in the USA alone and the worst inequality of any G7 nation.
We also know that is fascism because we have been examining the architects of the present political goals and ideology of the state for many decades. The harbinger of today began with Fred Koch Sr. in the 1950’s.
Interestingly, there is intersectionality between this administration and the McCarthy hearings and the Albert Hiss case long ago. Trump’s key mentor for many years was Roy Kohn, who also happened to be the prosecutor for the United States against the Rosenberg’s for committing treason against the USA for which they were executed.
The only thing that is a true threat to fascism is the organizational power of unions because striking for higher wages crosses political and religious boundaries and form to serve as a framework for the exchange of ideas, building consensus, and it interrupts the consolidation of capital. The public must have a means to claw back the excess capital that fascism uses to grease the wheels of its relationships within the state and the corrupted government. Without that, the wheels of fascist cooperation grind to a halt because it must have enormous cash flow and capital to sustain itself.
For more info https://davidwjonesusa.substack.com/p/yes-it-is-undeniably-fascism-we-have