The Myth of Central Bank Independence
The concept of central bank independence, long celebrated as a cornerstone of modern economic governance, represents one of the most successful yet questionable transfers of democratic power to technocratic authority in modern history. This arrangement, whereby crucial decisions about money creation and economic policy are deliberately insulated from democratic oversight, raises fundamental questions about the nature of democracy in an age of increasing economic inequality.
The traditional argument for central bank independence rests on what might be called the technical expertise fallacy – the notion that monetary policy is too complex for democratic deliberation and must therefore be left to experts. This reasoning mirrors historical arguments against democratic governance itself, when opponents of democracy claimed that ordinary citizens couldn't be trusted with political decisions. Yet just as political democracy has proven more stable and effective than autocracy, there's growing evidence that democratically accountable monetary policy might be more effective than our current technocratic model.
Consider the fundamental paradox of our current system: we accept democratic control over fiscal policy, taxation, and public spending – matters of comparable complexity to monetary policy – while insisting that monetary policy must remain under technocratic control. This inconsistency becomes even more striking when we consider that monetary policy often has more profound effects on wealth distribution and economic opportunity than many fiscal policies.
The consequences of this democratic deficit in monetary policy have become increasingly apparent. Central bank policies, particularly since the 2008 financial crisis, have consistently favored financial asset holders over wage earners, contributing to historic levels of wealth inequality. Quantitative easing, while presented as a technical response to economic crisis, has effectively constituted one of the largest upward redistributions of wealth in modern history, yet it was implemented with minimal democratic debate or oversight.
The current system's democratic deficit becomes even more problematic when we consider the relationship between monetary policy and environmental sustainability. Central banks, operating under their current mandates, effectively subsidize carbon-intensive industries through their asset purchase programs while lacking democratic accountability for the environmental consequences of these decisions. This highlights how the technical expertise justification for central bank independence often masks deeply political choices about our collective future.
Perhaps most fundamentally, the concept of central bank independence rests on a questionable assumption about the nature of money itself. Money is not merely a technical tool but a social institution – a system of relationships and obligations that shapes every aspect of social life. The current arrangement, whereby the creation and distribution of money is largely privatized through the commercial banking system and overseen by unaccountable central banks, represents a particular political choice rather than a technical necessity.
This privatized monetary system creates a democracy paradox – while we consider ourselves to live in a democratic society, one of the most fundamental aspects of social organization, the creation and distribution of money, remains largely outside democratic control. This arrangement has historical parallels with pre-democratic political systems, where crucial aspects of governance were reserved for privileged elites or religious authorities and considered too sacred for popular participation.
The consequences of this democratic deficit extend far beyond technical economic outcomes. The current system creates what critics have termed a "monetary monoculture," where a single form of money, created through private bank lending and managed by unaccountable central authorities, dominates economic life. This monoculture reduces resilience, limits innovation, and constrains democratic communities' ability to develop monetary tools suited to their needs.
The claim that central bank independence is necessary to prevent inflationary pressures from democratic demands ignores both historical evidence and contemporary reality. Many episodes of high inflation have occurred under independent central banks, while some systems with more democratic monetary control have maintained price stability. Moreover, the current system's bias toward asset price inflation while suppressing wage growth suggests that the real issue isn't preventing inflation per se, but rather determining who benefits from monetary policy.
Democratic Alternatives and Public Banking
The democratization of money requires more than simply reforming existing institutions; it demands a fundamental reimagining of how money is created, distributed, and controlled. This reimagining begins with the recognition that money is fundamentally a public utility – like water or electricity – and should be managed for the public good rather than private profit.
Public banking represents one of the most promising paths toward monetary democratization. Unlike private banks, which create money through lending primarily for private profit, public banks can create money in response to genuine community needs and democratic priorities. This isn't a radical innovation but rather a return to principles that have proven successful in various contexts, from the Bank of North Dakota's century of operation to the Reconstruction Finance Corporation's crucial role in funding the New Deal.
The potential scope of public banking extends far beyond simply providing an alternative to commercial banks. A network of public banks, operating at municipal, state, and federal levels, could fundamentally transform the monetary system's architecture. These institutions could create money through lending for public purposes – financing infrastructure, supporting small businesses, funding green energy transitions – while returning the profits of money creation to the public rather than private shareholders.
Moreover, public banks could serve as instruments of democratic monetary policy at multiple scales. Municipal public banks could create money to fund local infrastructure and development, while state banks could support regional economic development and environmental protection. At the federal level, a network of public banks could work in coordination with a democratized central bank to implement monetary policy that serves public rather than private interests.
The democratization of monetary policy also requires rethinking the relationship between money creation and environmental sustainability. A democratic monetary system could explicitly incorporate environmental criteria into lending decisions, creating money primarily for activities that support ecological restoration and climate stability rather than environmental destruction. This would represent a fundamental shift from the current system, where money creation through private banking often accelerates environmental degradation.
Digital technology opens new possibilities for democratic monetary innovation. Public digital currencies, issued and managed through democratic institutions, could combine the efficiency of digital payments with public purpose and democratic accountability. Unlike private cryptocurrencies or central bank digital currencies designed to enhance surveillance and control, democratic digital currencies could enhance privacy while serving community needs.
Participatory budgeting principles could be extended to monetary policy through participatory monetary policy. This would involve creating institutional mechanisms for democratic deliberation and decision-making about money creation and allocation. While critics might dismiss this as impractical, we already have models for complex democratic decision-making about technical issues, from citizen juries to participatory budgeting experiments.
The democratization of money also requires addressing the question of scale. While some monetary functions might best be managed at a national or international level, others could be decentralized to regional or local institutions. This multi-scalar approach could create what monetary theorists call monetary diversity – a variety of complementary monetary tools and institutions operating at different scales to serve different needs.
A crucial aspect of democratic monetary reform involves changing how new money enters the economy. Rather than relying primarily on private bank lending, which tends to inflate asset prices and exacerbate inequality, new money could be created through public investment in productive activities, basic income programs, or environmental restoration. This would transform money creation from a source of inequality into a tool for achieving democratic social goals.
The democratization of monetary policy would also require rethinking financial regulation. Rather than the current approach, which attempts to regulate private money creation after the fact, a democratic system would build public purpose and accountability into the very structure of monetary institutions. This would involve not just new rules but new institutional forms that align monetary creation with democratic values and objectives.
Implementation, Resistance, and the Path Forward
The transition to democratic monetary institutions faces significant challenges, not least from those who benefit from the current system. The financial sector's entrenched interests, combined with widespread misconceptions about money creation, create substantial obstacles to reform. However, several factors make this moment particularly opportune for monetary democratization.
The current conjuncture of crises – environmental, economic, and social – has exposed the limitations of our existing monetary system. The increasing frequency of financial crises, the growing wealth gap, and the system's inability to adequately fund responses to climate change have created legitimacy crisis for traditional monetary institutions. This crisis creates openings for fundamental reform that might have seemed impossible in more stable times.
Implementation of monetary democratization would likely need to proceed through several parallel tracks. At the local level, municipal public banks could be established to demonstrate the viability of public banking and build popular support for broader reforms. State-level public banks could follow, creating regional networks of public financial institutions. These institutions could initially operate within the existing monetary framework while building capacity and support for more fundamental reforms.
The resistance to monetary democratization would likely come in several forms. The most obvious would be direct opposition from financial interests that profit from the current system. However, potentially more significant would be ideological resistance – the deeply ingrained belief that money creation must remain a private, technical function rather than a public, democratic one. Overcoming this ideological barrier requires monetary literacy – public education about the nature of money and the possibilities for democratic alternatives.
A crucial strategy for implementing monetary reform involves prefigurative institutions – creating working examples of democratic monetary institutions that demonstrate their viability and benefits. This could include not just public banks but also complementary currency systems, democratic investment funds, and participatory budgeting initiatives. These institutions can serve as both practical experiments and organizing tools for broader reform.
The role of technology in monetary democratization deserves particular attention. While digital technology is often associated with private cryptocurrencies or centralized control, it could also enable new forms of democratic monetary governance. Blockchain technology, for instance, could be repurposed to create transparent, accountable systems of public money creation and allocation. Digital platforms could facilitate participatory monetary policy-making while ensuring privacy and democratic control.
The international dimension of monetary democratization presents both challenges and opportunities. While global financial markets might resist democratic monetary reforms, international cooperation between democratic monetary institutions could create alternatives to the current global financial system. Regional monetary cooperation, perhaps beginning with networks of public banks and complementary currencies, could gradually build toward alternative international monetary arrangements.
Climate change and environmental crisis create particular urgency for monetary democratization. The current system's inability to adequately fund environmental protection and transition to sustainable energy makes democratic monetary reform not just desirable but necessary for survival. Public banking networks could prioritize funding for renewable energy, conservation, and ecological restoration in ways that private banks, focused on short-term profits, cannot.
Labor movements and unions could play a crucial role in advancing monetary democratization. The current system's bias against wage growth and full employment makes democratic monetary reform a natural cause for organized labor. Unions could advocate for public banking and democratic monetary policy as part of a broader agenda for economic democracy and worker power.
Success in monetary democratization would likely require non-reformist reforms – changes that work within existing systems while building capacity and support for more fundamental transformation. This might involve initially focusing on achievable goals like municipal public banks while maintaining a longer-term vision of comprehensive monetary democracy.
The path forward requires building democratic monetary power, the organized capacity of democratic communities to create and control money for public purpose. This involves not just creating new institutions but building new forms of democratic knowledge and capacity. It requires developing monetary citizenship – the ability of citizens to participate meaningfully in decisions about money creation and allocation.
The ultimate goal of monetary democratization is not just to create more equitable or efficient financial institutions, but to transform money from a tool of private accumulation into an instrument of democratic self-governance. This transformation is essential not just for economic justice but for addressing the existential challenges we face, from climate change to social inequality. The question is not whether money will be political – it always has been – but whether it will serve democratic or oligarchic ends.
The USA's Old Republic had a great framework in these regards that existed for about 140 years from the 1830s until it was dismantled as part of the advent of the so called Neo Liberal Era. The Old Republic had interstate (sometimes inter region) capital flow inhibitors back then (we had them for every day of the nations existence until they were done away with between the latter 1970s and mid 1980s), we had state level usury laws, we had multiple classes of banks with some of them having geographic or sectoral capital allocation biases (we dont have those anymore despite appearances, like, they literally changed the laws for credit unions all the way back in, again, the latter 1970s to mid 1980s and made them fundamentally mostly not credit unions anymore, among other examples). And regards to the central bank, well, the central bank itself didnt become centralized until 1935, then there was some years of resistance to it, so it didnt really get up and running with real, wide, and deep centralization until after the war and then there was still all that other stuff that *mostly* checked and negated its de-democratizing aspects until the were slowly chipped away at and then done away with some big moves. But I've visited the debates and conversations leading up to its creation and there were other viable paths, including a modification of the prior system which was centered around the old Independent Treasury...
Could you please provide evidence or references containing it to justify the sentence in the text: “ Many episodes of high inflation have occurred under independent central banks, while some systems with more democratic monetary control have maintained price stability.”